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Statistical learning is assumed to occur automatically and implicitly, but little is known about
the extent to which the representations acquired over training are available to conscious
awareness. In this study, we focus on whether the knowledge acquired in a statistical
learning situation is available to conscious control. Participants were ﬁrst exposed to an
artiﬁcial language presented auditorily. Immediately thereafter, they were exposed to a sec-
ond artiﬁcial language. Both languages were composed of the same corpus of syllables and
differed only in the transitional probabilities.We ﬁrst determined that both languages were
equally learnable (Experiment 1) and that participants could learn the two languages and
differentiate between them (Experiment 2). Then, in Experiment 3, we used an adaptation
of the Process-Dissociation Procedure (Jacoby, 1991) to explorewhether participants could
consciously manipulate the acquired knowledge. Results suggest that statistical informa-
tion can be used to parse and differentiate between two different artiﬁcial languages, and
that the resulting representations are available to conscious control.
Keywords: statistical learning, process-dissociation procedure, implicit learning, consciousness
INTRODUCTION
Statistical learning broadly refers to people’s ability to become sen-
sitive to the regularities that occur in their environment by means
of associative learning mechanisms. Such sensitivity often extends
to the temporal domain, inasmuch as temporal structure is a cen-
tral feature of many skills, ranging from language processing to
action planning. The ﬁrst studies dedicated to statistical learning
per se essentially focused on language acquisition, and in particular
on speech segmentation. Thus, Saffran et al. (1996b) investigated
whether distributional cues could be used to identify words in
continuous speech. In their study, participants were exposed to a
streamof continuous speech composed of six trisyllabicwords that
were repeated in seemingly random order. The continuous speech
was produced by a speech synthesizer and contained no other seg-
mentation cues than statistical information, that is, the transitional
probabilities between the syllables. These probabilities were higher
for within-word syllable transitions than for between-word transi-
tions.After a brief exposure phase,participants had todiscriminate
between words of the artiﬁcial language and non-words. Results
indicated that they were able to do so, thus proving that tran-
sitional probabilities convey sufﬁcient information to effectively
parse continuous speech into units.
Subsequent studies have extended this seminal ﬁnding in many
different directions, documenting the central role that statistical
learning mechanisms play in different aspects of language acqui-
sition, such as speech segmentation (Saffran et al., 1996b; Jusczyk,
1999; Johnson and Jusczyk, 2001), lexicon development (Yu and
Ballard, 2007), or learning about the orthographic regularities
that characterize written words (Pacton et al., 2001). Further,
the importance of statistical learning has also been explored in
other domains, such as non-linguistic auditory processing (Saffran
et al., 1999), visual processing (Fiser and Aslin, 2002; Kim et al.,
2009), human action processing (Baldwin et al., 2008) or visuo-
motor learning (Cleeremans, 1993). While most of these studies
involved adult participants, many have also demonstrated that
children (Saffran et al., 1997) and infants (Aslin et al., 1998; Saf-
fran et al., 2001) are capable of statistical learning. Taken together,
these studies suggest that such learning can occur without aware-
ness (Saffran et al., 1997), automatically (Saffran et al., 1996a;
Fiser andAslin, 2001, 2002; Turk-Browne et al., 2005) and through
simple observation (Fiser and Aslin, 2005).
Though statistical learning can be viewed as a form of implicit
learning (Reber, 1967), this is not necessarily the case, and the rel-
evant literatures have so far remained rather disconnected from
each other. According to some authors, statistical and implicit
learning represent different ways of characterizing essentially the
same phenomenon (Conway and Christiansen, 2005; Perruchet
and Pacton, 2006). Indeed, just like statistical learning, implicit
learning is assumed to occur without awareness (Cleeremans et al.,
1998) and automatically (Jimenez and Mendez, 1999; Shanks and
Johnstone, 1999), or at least, incidentally. Although statistical
learning research has been essentially dedicated to exploring lan-
guage acquisition – with particular emphasis on development –
most implicit learning studies have instead been focused on adult
performance, with particular emphasis on understanding the role
of awareness in learning and the nature of the acquired knowl-
edge. Recently however, the two ﬁelds have begun to converge as
it became increasingly recognized that the processes involved in
artiﬁcial grammar or sequence learning are of a similar nature as
those involved in statistical learning studies (e.g.,Cleeremans et al.,
1998; Hunt and Aslin, 2001; Saffran and Wilson, 2003; Perruchet
and Pacton, 2006).
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Despite this emerging convergence, statistical learning studies
have seldom addressed what has long been the central focus of
implicit learning research, namely, the extent to which the rep-
resentations acquired by participants over training or exposure
are available to conscious awareness. As discussed above, most
statistical learning studies claim that such learning occurs with-
out conscious awareness. However, most of the relevant studies
have consisted in an incidental exposure phase followed by a two-
alternative forced-choice test (2AFC; Saffran et al., 2001; Saffran,
2002; Perruchet and Desaulty, 2008) in which participants are
instructed to choose the stimuli that feel most “familiar.” Famil-
iarity, however, can involve either implicit or explicit knowledge:
One can judge whether an item has been seen before based on
intuition or on recollection (for review Richardson-Klavehn et al.,
1996). The assumption that knowledge is implicit because people
learn incidentally and perform well on a familiarity task is there-
fore unwarranted. In this respect, the implicit learning literature
is suggestive that considerable care should be taken when draw-
ing conclusions about the extent to which acquired knowledge is
available to conscious awareness or not. This literature has also
suggested that which type of measure is used to assess awareness
is instrumental to our conclusions about whether learning was
truly implicit. A distinction is generally made between two types
of measures that can be used to assess awareness: Objective and
subjective measures.
Objective measures are quantitative (e.g., accuracy, reaction
times) and typically require participants to perform a discrim-
ination task, such as deciding whether a stimulus was present
or not (identiﬁcation) or deciding whether a stimulus has been
seen before or not (recognition). Subjective measures, by contrast,
require participants to report on their mental states and typically
take the form of free verbal reports or conﬁdence ratings (Dienes
and Berry, 1997). Both types of measures have been criticized
and have generated substantial debate. Subjective measures, for
instance, can be questioned based on the fact that they are biased
and depend on the manner in which participants interpret the
instructions (Eriksen, 1960; Reingold, and Merikle, 1993; Dulany,
1997). Thus, conservative participants may claim to be guessing
while actually knowing more about the stimulus than they report.
As a consequence, subjective measures may overestimate uncon-
scious knowledge. On the other hand, objective measures may
be contaminated by unconscious inﬂuences. Thus, a participant
who correctly recognizes a stimulus as “old”may do so not on the
basis of conscious recollection, but rather on the basis of a feel-
ing of familiarity. Objective measures may thus underestimate the
inﬂuence of unconscious knowledge.
Another issue comes from the fact that tasks in general involve
both conscious and unconscious knowledge. In this context,
Jacoby (1991) proposed his process-dissociation procedure (PDP)
as a way of overcoming the limitations of both objective and
subjective measures. The method rests on the assumption that
conscious knowledge is amenable to voluntary control whereas
information held without awareness is not. The PDP involves
contrasting performance in two versions of the same task. As
an illustration, imagine an experiment in which participants are
exposed to two different lists of words that they have to remem-
ber. Their memory of the words is tested through two tasks: an
inclusion and exclusion task. In Inclusion, participants are asked
to perform a simple old/new recognition judgment. Here, it is
assumed that both familiarity and recollection contribute to task
performance as participants may correctly classify a training item
either based on a feeling of familiarity or conscious recollection.
In Exclusion, by contrast, participants are instructed to recog-
nize only the words from the ﬁrst (or second) list. Under such
instructions, successful performance has to be based on conscious
recollection, as a mere feeling of familiarity may impair partic-
ipants’ ability to effectively differentiate between the test items
belonging either to the ﬁrst or the second language. Familiarity
may inﬂuence participants so that they incorrectly recognizewords
of the second (or ﬁrst) list. Familiarity and recollection thus act
in opposition during exclusion. By comparing performance in the
two tasks, it is therefore possible to estimate the extent to which
processing is conscious or not.
The PDP has been widely used to explore awareness in sit-
uations that involve tracking probabilities, such as in sequence
learning (Buchner et al., 1997, 1998; Destrebecqz and Cleere-
mans, 2001, 2003; Fu et al., 2008) or in artiﬁcial grammar learning
(Dienes et al., 1995). However, to the best of our knowledge, the
PDP has never been used in a paradigm more typical of statistical
learning situations, such as speech segmentation. In fact, little is
known about participants’ ability to consciously access the knowl-
edge they acquire during typical statistical learning situations.
Only one recent study (Kim et al., 2009) has directly attempted to
address this issue. Using a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP)
paradigmand amatching task (i.e., an 11-alternative forced-choice
task), the authors assessed sensitivity to the regularities contained
in the stream by means of reaction times to certain predictable or
unpredictable events and through correct responses on the match-
ing task. Participants exhibited fasterRTs in response topredictable
events while remaining unable to perform above chance on the
matching task. Based on these results, Kim et al. concluded that
visual statistical learning results in representations that remain
implicit. However, we believe that an 11-alternative forced-choice
taskmay fail to be sufﬁciently sensitive to all the relevant conscious
knowledge acquired by participants. Thus, this task may fail to ful-
ﬁll the sensitivity criterion (Shanks and St. John, 1994). Therefore,
participants’ failure could be due to task difﬁculty rather than to
the absence of explicit knowledge of the statistical regularities.
Here, we speciﬁcally focus on using a more sensitive test of
explicit knowledge so as to assesswhether or not statistical learning
results in conscious representations. More speciﬁcally, we assess
the extent to which learners are aware of the relevant contingen-
cies present in two artiﬁcial languages and on how conscious they
are of the representations of the languages acquired in a statistical
learning situation.
To do so, we conducted three experiments. In Experiment 1, we
ﬁrst explore whether learners can correctly ﬁnd the word bound-
aries in each of two artiﬁcial speech streams. In Experiment 2,
participants were successively exposed to the two speech streams
and immediately presented with two tasks: a 2AFC task and a
language decision task, in which they were asked to differentiate
words from the two artiﬁcial languages. If participants success-
fully performed the two tasks, this would suggest that they can
process two different sets of statistical information and that they
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formed two separate sets of representations, one for each language.
Finally, Experiment 3 aimed at assessing the relative contributions
of implicit and explicit memory by using the PDP. The exposure
phasewas identical to Experiment 2 andwas immediately followed
by an inclusion and an exclusion task. In Inclusion, participants
were asked to perform a simple old/new recognition judgment.
In Exclusion, participants are instructed to recognize not only the
test items but also the context (e.g., the language it comes from)
in which it has been presented. By comparing performance on the
two tasks, it is possible to estimate the extent to which processing
is conscious or not. Thus in Experiment 3, if participants learned
the two artiﬁcial languages consciously and independently (i.e.,
they consider the material to consist of two distinct languages and
they are able to differentiate them), we expect high performance
in the inclusion and the exclusion task. Participants should be able
to differentiate items belonging to the two languages from novel
items. They should also be able to differentiate items from the ﬁrst
and the second language. However, if learning was implicit or if
participants formed a single lexicon gathering words from both
languages, inclusion performance should be above chance (as it
may be based on familiarity) but exclusion should be at chance as
participants should not explicitly differentiate test items belonging
to the ﬁrst or the second language.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
The goal of Experiment 1 was to establish that both languages can
be learned when presented in isolation.
Participants
Twenty monolingual French-speaking undergraduate psychology
students (mean age: 20.8) were included in this study and received
class credits for participation. None of the participants had pre-
vious experience with the artiﬁcial languages presented in this
experiment. All reported no hearing problems.
Stimuli
We tested two different speech streams created from the same
sound inventory (the same syllable set), with a similar underlying
statistical structure. For clarity of discussion, we label each stream
as an “artiﬁcial language”: L1 and L2. Each language consisted of
4 artiﬁcial trisyllabic (CV.CV.CV) words composed of the same 12
syllables (see Figure 1). The two artiﬁcial languages were gener-
ated using the MBROLA speech synthesizer (Dutoit et al., 1996)
using two different male voices (fr1 and fr4).
We chose 12 French syllables that were considered as easily
distinguishable. We assembled the syllables to obtain a set of tri-
syllabic words. Four were assigned to L1 (bulago, kimolu, liteva,
and muviko) and four were assigned to L2 (govimu, luteki, vamoli,
and kolabu). The others were used as non-words and were never
presented during the exposure phase. All the words were pretested
in order to ensure that none of them sounded similar to a French
word. Finally, using Matlab, we created a script in order to gener-
ate the artiﬁcial speech streams. There were two conditions, which
differed by the time of exposure to the artiﬁcial languages: 10 or
20min. Each word was presented 300 times (in the 10-min condi-
tion) or 600 times (in the 20-min condition) in pseudo-random
FIGURE 1 |This figure shows the design of languages L1, L2.
order: the same word could not occur twice in succession. There
were no pause between syllables and no other acoustic cues to
signal word boundaries. As the succession of words was pseudo-
randomized, the transitional probabilities between each syllable
were 100% within words and 33% between words in both artiﬁ-
cial languages.Non-words had syllable transitional probabilities of
0%. L1 and L2 words did not share any syllable transition between
languages or with the non-words, that is all the transitional prob-
abilities of 100 or 33% in one language were null in the other or
in the non-words.
PROCEDURE
Participants were instructed to watch a series of cartoons during
which they would hear continuous speech spoken in an unknown
language. They were not informed about the length or structure
of the words or about how many words each language contained.
They were randomly assigned to the short or the long exposure
condition. Stimuli were presented during either 10 or 20min.After
the exposure, participants performed a recognition task. In each
trial a trisyllabic string (spoken by a female voice, V3) was pre-
sented and participants had to decide if the string was a word
from the language they had heard or not. The material consisted
of the four words of the language and randomly chosen non-
words, which consisted in trisyllabic words composed by the same
syllables as the language but with null transitional probabilities
between syllables (see Figure 1).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results are presented in Figure 2. As typically used in statisti-
cal learning studies (Saffran et al., 1996a; Gebhart et al., 2009), we
analyzed recognition data by assessingmeanpercentages of correct
responses. Performance exceeded chance for both languages. L1
Participants averaged 68.93% of correct responses, t (10)= 4.464,
p< 0.005, Cohen’s d = 1.470. L2 participants averaged 69.38% of
www.frontiersin.org September 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 229 | 3
Franco et al. Statistical learning of two artiﬁcial languages
FIGURE 2 | Endorsement rates for words and for non-words in the recognition task.
correct responses, t (9)= 4.378, p< 0.005, Cohen’s d = 1.850. An
independent-sample t -test revealed no difference between L1 and
L2, t (19)=−0.503, p> 0.5. We thus pooled L1 and L2 partici-
pants together for further analysis. We asked whether exposure
duration had an effect on performance. Another independent-
sample t -test revealed no difference between the two exposure
durations, t (19)= 0.882, p> 0.5. Participants exposed to the arti-
ﬁcial language for 10min averaged 68.76% of correct responses,
whereas those who had been exposed for 20min averaged 69.63%
of correct responses. Results demonstrate that the two different
artiﬁcial languages were learnable when presented in isolation.
Moreover, learning across both languages did not differ signiﬁ-
cantly and 10min appear to be sufﬁcient to learn the language. The
next experiment investigates whether the two languages remain
learnable when they are presented successively for 10min each.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-eight monolingual French-speaking undergraduate psy-
chology students (mean age: 20.8) were included in this study and
received class credits for participation, with the same conditions
as in Experiment 1.
Stimuli
The stimuli were identical to Experiment 1.
PROCEDURE
As in Experiment 1, participants watched a set of cartoons and
were exposed to two continuous speech streams. First, they were
exposed to L1 (spoken by V1) for 10min. Then, participants were
told that they were going to see another set of cartoons accom-
panied by another stream of continuous speech in an unknown
language, different from the ﬁrst one. They were exposed to L2
(spoken by V2) during 10min. A short break was given between
the two exposures. Language order, voices, and the set of cartoons
were fully counterbalanced. After exposure, participants were told
that the continuous speech they had heardwas composed bywords
presented successively and repeated several times. As in Experi-
ment 1, they were neither informed about the length of the words
nor about howmanywords each language contained. To test learn-
ing of the languages, participants were asked to perform a 2AFC
task. On each trial, participants heard a word from one of the two
languages and a non-word (separated by 400ms of silence). They
were instructed to indicate which one sounded more like one of
the languages that they had heard. There were 32 trials: each word
of each language was presented four times (either in the ﬁrst or in
the second position) and was paired with one of the non-words
(chosen randomly). The trials were presented in pseudo-random
order: the same word was never presented twice in succession. To
test whether participants were able to differentiate the two lan-
guages, we ﬁnally asked them to perform a discrimination task
in which, on each trial, a word from either L1 or from L2 was
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presented, and participants were asked to indicate whether the
word belonged to the ﬁrst or the second language. Each word was
presented three times in pseudo-random order.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results are presented in Figure 3. In the AFC task, L1 and
L2 words were presented four times each, as the non-words were
only presented twice. In order to ensure that responses were not
inﬂuenced by the frequency of each stimulus, we checked con-
sistency between participants’ responses to the ﬁrst occurrence
of each word and the responses to the subsequent occurrences.
A paired-sample t -test showed that average performance on the
ﬁrst and the subsequent presentations of the words did not differ
from each other, t (27)=−1.003, p> 0.1. Thus, while we cannot
exclude that participants’ responses were inﬂuenced by item fre-
quency, these results nevertheless indicate that no such difference
exists in our sample. However, in the following analysis we will
ﬁrst present results based only on the ﬁrst presentations of each
word and then results based on the four presentations. All the
statistical analyses were carried out with two-tailed tests. A single-
sample t -test showed that mean performance was above chance,
t (27)= 5.062, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.957. A paired-samples t -
test revealed no differences in performance across languages,
t (27)= 1.451, p> 0.1. Also, there was no signiﬁcant difference
due to the order of presentation of the languages, t (26)= 0.142,
p> 0.5. The mean score on the ﬁrst presentation of each word was
18.71 out of a possible 32 (58.48%), with chance performance
at 16. A single-sample t -test showed that mean performance
was above chance, t (27)= 2.139, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.574.
The mean score on the 2AFC task based on all four presenta-
tions of each word was 19.64 (61.43%). We also compared the
mean performance for the ﬁrst and the second language pre-
sented. Participants’ mean performance for the ﬁrst language was
65.88%, t (27)= 5.578, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.054 and 56.95%,
t (27)= 2.136, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.404, for the second lan-
guage presented. The mean performance was signiﬁcantly higher
for the ﬁrst than for the second language presented, t (27)= 2.168,
p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.593.
Finally, a independent-sample t -test revealed a signiﬁcant dif-
ference with Experiment 1 when languages were presented in
isolation, t (36)= 2.095, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.698. This dif-
ference was due to weak performance in the second language
presented. Indeed, while the mean performance in Experiment
1 did not differ from the ﬁrst language presented (p> 0.1), it
was signiﬁcantly higher than for the second language presented
t (36)= 3.120, p< 0.05.
The mean score on the decision task was 13.82 of a possi-
ble 24 (57.61%). A single-sample t -test showed that performance
was above chance, t (27)= 3.840, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.755.
A paired-samples t -test revealed no difference across languages,
t (27)= 0.125,p> 0.5. Another paired-samples t -test revealed that
the mean performance in this task did not signiﬁcantly differ
from the performance in the forced-choice task, t (27)= 1.296,
p> 0.1.
FIGURE 3 | Mean percentage of correct responses for words and non-words (plotted together) in the 2AFC task and the L1L2 decision task.
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Experiment 2 demonstrates that learners are able to learn two
artiﬁcial languages based only on statistical information such as
the transitional probabilities between syllables. Both languages are
learned, but the ﬁrst language is better learned that the second.
Indeed,while participants perform for the ﬁrst language presented
as when the language is presented in isolation, the mean per-
formance for the second language presented is weaker (although
above chance level). It seems that the learning of the statistical reg-
ularities of the ﬁrst language has a decreasing effect on the capacity
to learn a new set of transitional probabilities based on the same
corpus of syllables. This is consistent with recent studies (Geb-
hart et al., 2009). Results on the discrimination task are consistent
with Weiss et al. (2009) ﬁndings: participants form distinct repre-
sentations for the words of each language, since they are able to
categorize the words as belonging to the ﬁrst or to the second lan-
guage. A proper interpretation of the PDP requires ensuring that
participants learned both languages separately. The success of the
2AFC task and the discrimination task guarantees that results we
will ﬁnd with the PDP are not biased by the fact that participants
could not learn the languages, or that they learned both languages
as one. In Experiment 3,we used an adaptation of the PDP in order
to determine the amount of conscious and automatic processing
that contribute to the acquisition and differentiation of the two
artiﬁcial languages.
EXPERIMENT 3
METHOD
Participants
Forty monolingual French-speaking undergraduate psychology
students (mean age: 20.6) were included in this study and received
class credits for participation. None of the participants had pre-
vious experience with the artiﬁcial languages presented in this
experiment. All reported no hearing problems.
Stimuli
The stimuli were identical to Experiment 1.
PROCEDURE
The material and the exposure phase of Experiment 3 were identi-
cal to that of Experiment 2. Participants were subsequently asked
to perform the inclusion and exclusion tasks (all the participants
performed ﬁrst the inclusion and then the exclusion task). In both
tasks, the stimuli presented were identical, only the instructions
changed. There were 32 trials in which a trisyllabic string was pre-
sented (all the words of each language were presented twice and
non-words chosen randomly were presented once). In Inclusion,
they were asked to answer “yes” when the presented trisyllabic
string (spoken by a female voice, V3) was a word from L1 or from
L2, and “no” when it was a new word. In Exclusion, participants
were asked to answer “yes” when the string was a word from L1
(re: L2) and “no” when it was a word from L2 (re: L1) or a new
word.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In both Inclusion and Exclusion tasks the L1 and L2 words were
presented two times each, Non-Words were only presented once.
In order to ensure that participants responses had not been inﬂu-
enced by the frequency of occurrence of each stimulus we ﬁrst
checked whether there was a difference in performance for the
occurrence and the second occurrence of each word. Two paired-
sample t -tests showed that the mean performance for the ﬁrst and
the second presentation of the words differed neither in Inclu-
sion, t (39)=−0.142, p> 0.5, nor in Exclusion, t (39)= 0.773,
p> 0.1. Second, we analyzed inclusion results by calculating the
mean percentages of correct responses. Participants discriminated
L1 and L2 words from non-words better than chance, achiev-
ing 61.88% correct responses, t (39)= 7.806, p< 0.001, Cohen’s
d = 1.234. We then compared endorsement rates – that is the
amount of responses “yes” – for words (from L1 and L2) and for
non-words. A paired-samples t -test indicated that the tendency
to answer “yes” was signiﬁcantly higher when the stimuli were L1
or L2 words (62.34%) than when they were non-words (38.60%),
t (39)=−7.799, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.905. Further, we com-
pared the mean percentages of correct responses of the ﬁrst and
the second language that they had been exposed to (i.e., regard-
less of whether this had been L1 or L2). Participants averaged
68.44%, t (39)= 5.713, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.907 of correct
responses on words from the ﬁrst language to which they were
exposed and 56.25%, t (39)= 2.105, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.333
of correct responses on words from the second language. A paired-
sample t -test showed that participant’s performance on the ﬁrst
language was signiﬁcantly higher than on the second language
t (39)=−2.404, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.597 (Figure 4).
Second, we analyzed exclusion performance. The average per-
centage of correct responses was 58.60%, which exceeded chance
level, t (39)= 4.433,p< 0.001,Cohen’s d = 0.701.As it appeared in
the inclusion task that participants performed better for the words
of the ﬁrst language presented than those of the second language,
wewanted to check if exclusion performance depended on the lan-
guage that they were instructed to exclude, namely the ﬁrst or the
second language they were exposed to. An independent-sample t -
test indicated that performance did not differ signiﬁcantlywhether
they had to exclude the ﬁrst language or the second language
(p> 0.1). We then compared the endorsement rates for words
to include (i.e., words from the language that they had to answer
“yes”), words to exclude (the words from the language they had
had to exclude), and non-words (Figure 5).
A paired-samples t -test revealed a signiﬁcant difference
between the tendency to answer “yes” to target words (49.06%
of “yes” responses) and to non-words (37.04%), t (39)= 2.757,
p< 0.005, Cohen’s d = 0.506. The same analysis showed a mar-
ginal difference words to exclude (40.63%) and words to include,
t (39)=−1.770, p= 0.084. The tendency to answer “yes” did not
differ between words to exclude and non-words (p> 0.1).
These results suggest that even if participants seem to be able to
perform the exclusion task, it is not clear that they differentiate the
two languages. However, the results of Experiment 2 show that,
when exposed to two artiﬁcial languages presented successively,
participants form two distinct representations for the words of
each language. Previous research shows that in this kind of learn-
ing situation individual differences can be observed: for a given
exposure, some participants will be able to extract the words from
the continuous speech while some other won’t. In order to see if
when participants learn both languages the knowledge acquired
is amenable to conscious control, we applied the method as used
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FIGURE 4 | Endorsement rates for words and for non-words in the inclusion task.
by Sanders et al. (2002) in order to analyze separately high and
low learners. Participants were divided into two groups based on
a median split (M = 64.10%) of mean performance on inclusion
task (which was highly correlated to the mean performance on
exclusion task, r = 0.460, p< 0.005).
High learners had a mean performance of 69.85%,
t (19)= 19.379, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 4.333, in the inclusion
task. The mean performance for the ﬁrst language was 74.38%,
t (19)= 6.253, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.334, and 65.00% for
the second language, t (19)= 3.040, p< 0.01, Cohen’s d = 1.270.
A paired-sample t -test showed that performance for the ﬁrst
and second language did not differ signiﬁcantly (p> 0.05). In
the exclusion task, high learners showed a mean performance
of 63.90%, t (19)= 5.160, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.540. The
endorsement rates for words to include (M = 50.63) signiﬁcantly
differed from words to exclude (M = 35.63), t (19)=−2.239,
p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.706, and from non-words (M = 29.70),
t (19)= 3.436, p< 0.005, Cohen’s d = 0.985. Words to exclude
and non-word’s endorsement rates did not differ signiﬁcantly
(p> 0.1).
Low learners had a mean performance of 53.29%,
t (19)= 2.930, p< 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.655 in the inclusion task.
Endorsement rates for the ﬁrst language did not reach signiﬁcance
(M = 56.25, p> 0.1) and was marginal for the second language
(M = 58.13, p= 0.067). Congruently, results on the exclusion
task show that low learners’ mean performance failed to reach
signiﬁcance (M = 53.29, p> 0.1). These results show that even if
the mean performance on inclusion task is above the chance level,
low learners correctly rejected non-words but also rejected words
and failed to learn the two languages.
Taken together, the results on the inclusion and exclusion task
show high learners were able to extract words from the ﬁrst and
the second languages presented. Moreover, they were able to fol-
low exclusion instructions and to intentionally exclude items from
one of the two learned languages. On the other hand, low learners
seem to learn both languages and to succeed on the inclusion task,
which is suggestive that they were somehow sensitive to statistical
information. However we also found that above chance perfor-
mance was only due to the large number of correct rejections for
these participants. Thus, it appears that low learners did not truly
extract words from continuous speech but merely acquired a cer-
tain familiarity with the material, which was sufﬁcient to enable
them to correctly reject the non-words but not strong enough to
correctly accept the words. One possibility could be that partic-
ipants parsed the continuous speech into smaller units, but that
these units failed to respect the actual boundaries between the
artiﬁcial words (e.g., bisyllabic words).
Finally, we wanted to estimate the extent to which knowledge
about the two languages was available to conscious awareness. To
do so,we computed an awareness score for each participant, as fol-
lows:We ﬁrst computed the frequencywithwhich aword had been
correctly accepted in inclusion. Next, we computed the frequency
with which a word had been incorrectly accepted in exclusion.
Finally, we subtracted, for each participant, the latter from the
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FIGURE 5 | Endorsement rates for target words, distracting words, and for non-words in the exclusion task.
former. A positive difference between the inclusion and exclusion
scores reﬂects a capacity to recognize the words of each language
and to control this knowledge so as to follow the exclusion instruc-
tions. We should thus conclude, in the case of a positive score,
that knowledge is at least partly conscious. On the other hand, a
negative or null difference would indicate an inability to control
one’s knowledge about the languages and to follow the exclusion
instructions. In this case, we should thus conclude that knowledge
about the two languages is at least partly unconscious, as partic-
ipants cannot intentionally differentiate between L1 and L2. The
analysis showed that the mean scores were 5.22 in Inclusion and
3.25 in Exclusion (Figure 6), resulting in a mean difference of 1.97.
A single-sample t -test showed that this difference was signiﬁcantly
above zero, t (40)= 5.897, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.932.
As can be seen on Figure 6, eight participants obtained a dif-
ference score that was either negative or null. Two of them were
high learners and the other six were low learners. To ﬁnd out
whether these participants had applied unconscious knowledge or
had simply failed to learn about the two languages, we examined
their inclusion scores separately. The mean inclusion score was
56.26%, which, t (7)= 2.080, p= 0.076. However, as the endorse-
ment rates for the ﬁrst language (M = 56.25%, p> 0.5) or the
second (M = 48.44%, p> 0.5) failed to reach signiﬁcance, this
marginal score was only due to a high correct rejection of the
non-words.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the previous experiment.
Experiment 3 thus conﬁrms that learners can parse the two speech
streams presented successively. Congruently with the results of
Experiment 2, the learning of a ﬁrst language seems to decrease –
but not inhibit – the capacity to learn a second language based
on the exact same corpus of syllables. The strength of the effect
of the ﬁrst language on the second language learning seems to be
prone to important individual differences. Moreover, our analysis
of the awareness scores shows that – when participants learn both
languages – the knowledge acquired during exposure is amenable
to conscious control, and should thus be taken to be conscious
knowledge as per the PDP assumptions. Altogether, our results are
suggestive that participants who have been able to learn about the
two languages are also able to subsequently exert intentional, con-
scious control on the application of this knowledge, that is, more
speciﬁcally, to refrain from accepting to-be-excluded words under
exclusion instructions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aimof our studywas to rethink the idea that statistical learning
occurs without conscious awareness. To do so, we used the PDP
as a sensitive measure of the relative contributions of conscious
and unconscious knowledge to the control of knowledge acquired
during statistical learning. Our results suggest that the statistical
information contained in a speech stream can be used to correctly
track word boundaries in a situation of double language input:
Adult participants can track the transitional probabilities present
in two artiﬁcial languages presented successively. When the two
languages share all the same characteristics but for the transitional
Frontiers in Psychology | Language Sciences September 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 229 | 8
Franco et al. Statistical learning of two artiﬁcial languages
FIGURE 6 | Awareness scores for each participant. Individual scores are
represented as points with coordinates corresponding to the frequency with
which a word has been correctly accepted under inclusion instructions
(Y -axis) and the frequency with which a word has been incorrectly accepted in
the exclusion task (X -axis). When the inclusion score is higher than the
exclusion score (that is, when the corresponding point falls above the
diagonal), participant’s knowledge can be considered to be at least partly
conscious.When the inclusion score is smaller or equal to the exclusion score
(the point falls below or on the diagonal), participant’s knowledge can be
considered to be at least partly unconscious.
probabilities between syllables, the learning of the ﬁrst language
reduces the capacity to learn the second language. However, par-
ticipants still learn the second language and, congruently with
previous studies, form distinct representations for the words of
each language. Our study further suggests, through our applica-
tion of the PDP, that participants who learned both languages have
conscious knowledge of the two languages, to the extent that they
can use the knowledge intentionally (in particular, they can refrain
from using it when instructed to do so). In the following, we ﬁrst
discuss our results concerning segmentation of artiﬁcial languages,
and then turn to the issue of awareness.
Experiment 1 was aimed at demonstrating that our two arti-
ﬁcial languages were learnable and to the same extent over
the course of a 10-min exposure. In Experiment 2, two speech
streams were presented successively for 10min each in order to
explore how the statistical information allow extracting word
units from two distinct artiﬁcial languages. Participants parsed
the two speech streams and, more importantly, they were capa-
ble of differentiating between the two languages, suggesting that
two separate representations were formed. In Experiment 3, we
extended the results of Experiment 2 by exploring, using the
PDP, the extent to which participants who learn both languages
were able to intentionally manipulate their knowledge of the two
languages.
Results of Experiment 2 partially converge with the results
obtained by Weiss et al. (2009) and Gebhart et al. (2009). In both
studies, participants were exposed to two streams of continuous
speech that shared part of the syllables. The two different streams
were produced by two different voices, providing a strong con-
textual cue for the change of language. Their results showed that
learners can track and maintain separate two sets of statistics when
a strong contextual cue (talker’s voice) was present. In these stud-
ies, participants learned both languages equally, while in our study
the ﬁrst language was better learned than the second. This differ-
ence could be due to the fact that in Weiss et al.’s and Gebhart et
al. (Experiment 3) the two languages shared only a few syllables,
while in our study all the syllableswere common to both languages.
Therefore, if participants learned the ﬁrst language, learning the
second would imply a reorganization of the whole corpus of tran-
sitional probabilities between and within syllables resulting in a
weaker mean performance for the second language. It is possible
that with a longer exposition to the second language (as inGebhart
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et al., 2009, Experiment 5) combined with contextual cues would
result in similar performance on the ﬁrst and second language.
The aim of Experiment 3 was to explore the issue of the con-
scious awareness in a statistical learning situation. We found that
participants who have been able to correctly parse the speech
streams learned the two artiﬁcial languages, could differentiate
them and are able to exert conscious control on this knowledge.
However, there was an important variation between participant’s
performance: while some participants seemed to have no difﬁcul-
ties to follow the inclusion and the exclusion instructions, some
other were unable to succeed the inclusion task. As the aim of our
study was to explore the access to the knowledge acquired dur-
ing the exposition phase, we had to make sure that participants
actually acquired the knowledge. To do so, we applied a method
used by Sanders et al. (2002), which consists in splitting (at the
median at the inclusion task) the sample in two groups: the low
and the high learners. First, the analysis of high learners showed
that only this group learned both languages. Moreover, they were
able to follow the exclusion instructions and exclude the words
from on of the languages – either if it was the ﬁrst or the second
language presented. These results suggest that when participants
can parse the continuous speech of two distinct artiﬁcial languages
properly differentiated (with context cues), the two languages are
encoded separately and amenable to conscious control: partici-
pants are capable of a deep processing that is required to succeed
in the exclusion task: identify the source of the word (ﬁrst or sec-
ond language) and then correctly reject theword if it belongs to the
language to exclude. Second, the analysis of low learners showed
that these participants are not just unable to follow the exclusion
instructions: they actually did not learn the artiﬁcial languages
(both or just one of them).
This difference between low and high learners raises one recent
issue about individual differences in statistical learning. Indeed, lit-
tle is known about statistical learning variation in normal adults.
Most recent evidence comes from the implicit learning litera-
ture (Robinson, 2005; Brooks et al., 2006; Kempe et al., 2010)
and reports a positive correlation between IQ Test scores and
implicit learning tasks. Recently, Misyak and Christiansen (in
press) reported an existing relationbetween adjacent dependencies
in artiﬁcial grammar learning – which can be linked to transitional
probabilities in speech segmentation – and subjects’ performance
on verbal working memory and forward digit span tasks. Thus it
seems that these individual differences could be related to short-
term memory spam and verbal working memory. Unfortunately,
in our study none of thesemeasureswere taken.However, in future
studies short-term and working memory tasks could provide a
reliable indication of the low and high learners.
The second issue of this paper concerned the conscious access to
the representations acquired during learning. Statistical learning is
often considered to be an automatic, incidental (see Perruchet and
Pacton, 2006 for review), and implicit (Kim et al., 2009) process
similar to those involved in implicit learning (Reber, 1967; see also
Cleeremans et al., 1998). Little is known, however, about the extent
to which the acquired representations are themselves implicit or
explicit. One possible reason is that the central issues in statistical
learning research traditionally focus on language acquisition and
not on the role of awareness in learning. However, Saffran et al.
(1997) found that adult and children learners were able to process
transitional probabilities in passive situations and concluded that
statistical learning can proceed incidentally without awareness.
More recently, Kim et al. (2009) suggested that visual statistical
learning occurs without conscious awareness of the regularities.
They took an implicit (reaction times in a RSVP detection task)
and an explicit measure (correct responses in a matching task)
of learning. While participants’ reaction times performance indi-
cated that they did learn the exposed sequences, their performance
at the matching task was at chance. The authors thus concluded
that they acquired implicit but not explicit knowledge of the visual
sequences. However, the matching task used to measure explicit
knowledge of the sequences consisted in an 11 forced-choice task,
and one could argue that this test of awareness may not be suf-
ﬁciently sensitive to all relevant conscious knowledge acquired
during the learning phase. It is possible that this matching task do
not meet the requirements of the “sensitivity criterion” (Shanks
and St. John, 1994) and therefore the low performance observed
may be due to the difﬁculty of the task rather than the absence
of explicit knowledge. Indeed, Bertels et al. (under revision) repli-
catedKimet al.’s study using a four forced-choice task as an explicit
measure of knowledge. They found that participants were able
to perform above chance the explicit task, suggesting that visual
statistical learning lies on both implicit and explicit knowledge.
Taken together, these two studies highlight the importance to
use implicit (indirect) tasks combined with the usual explicit
(direct) tasks used in statistical learning studies. Indeed, direct
tasks can be performed based on either recollection or familiarity,
or based on a combination of both (Merikle and Reingold, 1991).
For this reason, Jacoby (1991) has claimed that tasks in general,
be they direct or indirect, are never process-pure. Instead, all of
them can be inﬂuenced by both controlled (explicit knowledge)
and automatic (familiarity) processes. Thus, the PDP provides an
elegant way to separate the relative contribution of controlled and
automatic processes to performance (Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1994).
This procedure was often used in implicit learning studies, namely
sequence learning (Buchner et al., 1997, 1998; Destrebecqz and
Cleeremans, 2001, 2003) and artiﬁcial grammar learning exper-
iments (Dienes et al., 1995). In their study, Dienes et al. (1995)
presented participants with letter strings generated by two dif-
ferent artiﬁcial grammars. Their results showed that they could
control their knowledge in a subsequent test phase performed
under inclusion and exclusion instructions. Consistent with these
results, our study constitutes the ﬁrst attempt to adapt the PDP
to a statistical learning situation. The results of Experiment 3 are
suggestive that although participants are not explicitly instructed
to ﬁnd the words in our experimental situation, the resulting rep-
resentations are nevertheless explicit. These results are consistent
with previous studies in implicit learning (Perruchet and Vinter,
1998; Cleeremans and Jiménez, 2002), indicating that automatic
and incidental learning processes can nevertheless result in con-
scious representations, at least under these speciﬁc training and
testing conditions. Further research should investigate whether
this kind of knowledge remains conscious when the languages
and/or the links between the languages become more complex.
For instance, when the two languages share some of the syllabic
transitions. In conclusion, our results provide a ﬁrst evidence that
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distributional information can allow segmentation and the cre-
ation of two different representations of two distinct artiﬁcial
speeches presented successively and, more importantly, that these
representations are available to conscious access and to cognitive
control by adult learners.
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